

Hobart Municipal Emergency Management Committee

Insights from the Los Angeles Fires for Hobart

30 April 2025

City of HOBART

Contents

Executive summary 4
1. Introduction 6
2. Background 7
2.1 LA Fires 7
2.2 Hobart bushfire risk 10
3. Methodology 13
4. Results 15
4.1 Preparedness 15
4.1.1 Collaboration 15
4.1.2 Community 15
4.1.3 Governance 16
4.1.4 Households and incentives 16
4.1.5 Planning and research 16
4.1.6 Public information, education and warnings 17
4.1.7 Resources and capabilities 17
4.1.8 Training and exercises 17
4.1.9 Vulnerable groups 17
4.2 Evacuation 18
4.2.1 Animals 18
4.2.2 Collaboration 18
4.2.3 Community 18
4.2.4 Evacuation centres 18
4.2.5 Evacuation routes 19
4.2.6 Governance 19
4.2.7 Infrastructure and assets 19
4.2.8 Public Information, education and warnings 19
4.2.9 Training and exercises 20
4.2.10 Vegetation and landscape management 20
4.2.11 Vulnerable groups 20
4.3 Response 20
4.3.1 Collaboration 20
4.3.2 Community 21

4.3.3 Governance....21
4.3.4 Infrastructure and assets....21
4.3.5 Planning and research....21
4.3.6 Public information, education and warnings....21
4.3.7 Resources and capabilities....22
4.3.8 Training and exercises....22
5. Focus areas....23
6. Conclusion....29
7. Appendix....30
Appendix A – Agenda....30

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Special Meeting of the Hobart Municipal Emergency Management Committee (HMEMC) on 30 April 2025 was convened to examine the catastrophic January 2025 Los Angeles (LA) Fires and identify insights to reduce Hobart's bushfire risk. Recognising the parallels between Hobart's bushfire risk profile and the conditions that led to the LA Fires disaster, the session brought together 33 stakeholders from across government, emergency services, academia, and community organisations.

The report is based on participant perspectives rather than exhaustive technical analysis, and is intended to capture discussion themes and opportunities for improvement – not to provide a definitive or comprehensive assessment.

Key findings include:

- Preparedness: While Hobart benefits from strong interagency collaboration and community engagement programs, participants noted issues of investment, scale and sustained reach with ongoing needs in public education, household-level mitigation, and support for vulnerable groups. Ideas raised included enhancing public education, incentivising private risk reduction, and continuing to align coordination and pre-planned triggers for catastrophic fire days across established forums.
- Evacuation: Established evacuation centre arrangements and interagency cooperation were seen as strengths. Participants raised challenges such as limited evacuation route options, and perceived gaps in planning for animals and vulnerable populations. Ideas included simulating traffic scenarios, communicating evacuation and catastrophic fire weather scenarios to the

community, considering evacuation centre safety, and treating vegetation along key routes.

- Response: Tasmania’s governance structures and collaborative culture were praised, while concerns were raised about sustaining government resources during extended and concurrent events, infrastructure vulnerabilities and public expectations of emergency services during catastrophic events. Ideas included strengthening infrastructure redundancy, expanding training for support agencies, and supporting public understanding of shared responsibility.

The full report was adopted by the HMEMC in October 2025. This is a summarised version.

1. INTRODUCTION

The City of Hobart, like many bushfire-prone jurisdictions, recognises that the catastrophic Los Angeles (LA) Fires of January 2025 could plausibly occur in Southern Tasmania under similar conditions. While Hobart's experience of the 1967 Black Tuesday bushfires remains a pivotal historical event, the city's population, urban footprint, and risk profile have changed significantly since then[1].

The HMEMC convened a special meeting on 30 April 2025 to reflect on lessons from the LA Fires, consider current capabilities and constraints across preparedness, evacuation and response, and capture observations to inform continued improvement.

As climate projections indicate an increase in the frequency of dangerous fire weather in Tasmania[2], and specifically Hobart[3], and with Hobart's complex peri-urban landscape, constrained road networks, and legacy planning issues, this forum used the LA Fires as a catalyst to better understand local bushfire risk and readiness.

[1] bushfire-management-strategy-2022.pdf
[2] Report_CFT_Future-Fire-Technical-Report_2015_web.pdf
[3] climate-change-information-for-decision-making-hobart_2020.pdf

2. BACKGROUND

2.1 LA Fires



Figure 1: Beachfront properties destroyed by the Palisades Fire[4]

From 7 to 31 January, 14 major fires affected the greater Los Angeles metropolitan area and San Diego County, with the Palisades and Eaton Fires the two most destructive. They burned in the Northern Hemisphere's winter, which while surprising is not uncommon[5].

Key impacts of the LA fires included:

- 31 direct fatalities[6]

[4] California wildfires in photos: Images show the catastrophic scale in Los Angeles and the Palisades
[5] https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8411922/
[6] https://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/bos/supdocs/207915.pdf

- 440 indirect deaths due to factors such as poor air quality, stress, disruption to health systems and mental health impacts[7]
- Over 250,000 placed under evacuation warnings or orders[8]
- 18,189 homes and structures destroyed[9]
- More than 57,000 acres burned[10]
- Estimated insured losses of US$40 billion and broader economic losses of US$57 billion[11]
- A 0.48% decline in county-level GDP, equivalent to approximately US$4.6 billion[12]
- US$297 million in total wage losses for local businesses and workers[13].

The LA fires were driven by a combination of prolonged drought conditions, low humidity, a buildup of vegetation from the previous winter, and extreme Santa Ana winds, which in some places reached 160 km/h. The winds grounded aircraft during critical periods and reduced real-time situational awareness, and overwhelmed suppression[14]. Additionally, research shows Californian properties exposed to wildfire risk increased by 40% between 1990 and 2020[15]. Urban conflagration in dense suburbs via “connective fuels” such as decks and fences enabled rapid structure-to-structure fires in older, closely spaced housing[16].

[7] Excess Deaths Attributable to the Los Angeles Wildfires From January 5 to February 1, 2025 | Research, Methods, Statistics | JAMA | JAMA Network
[8] https://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/bos/supdocs/207915.pdf
[9] Resilient Power Systems Against Wildfire Risks: Towards a Human-centric and Secure Future
[10] Resilient Power Systems Against Wildfire Risks: Towards a Human-centric and Secure Future
[11] 1H-2025-Global-Catastrophe-Recap.pdf
[12] Economic Impact of the Los Angeles Wildfires | UCLA Anderson School of Management
[13] Economic Impact of the Los Angeles Wildfires | UCLA Anderson School of Management
[14] https://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/bos/supdocs/207915.pdf
[15] Forest Service Research Data Archive
[16] https://ibhs1.wpenginepowered.com/wp-content/uploads/2025-LAFires-EarlyFieldObservations.pdf

In the After-Action Review of Alert and Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires, the McChrystal Group[17] identified five key focus areas:

1. Policies, protocols, standard operating procedures and authority: Unclear and sometimes inconsistent rules about who had authority to make evacuation decisions and issue warnings slowed responses during rapidly changing conditions.
2. Training and planning coordination: Agencies and communities across Los Angeles were not equally prepared or trained for a large, fast-moving urban fire.
3. Resource management: Staffing and equipment were stretched by multiple simultaneous fires, compounded by existing staffing gaps and aging or limited equipment.
4. Situational awareness and interoperability: Responders lacked a shared, real-time picture of fire behaviour due to grounded aircraft, limited surveillance, and systems that did not integrate well across agencies.
5. Community engagement and public information: Many residents found warnings confusing, inconsistent, inaccessible or too late, exacerbated by power outages and mobile-network failures.

[17] https://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/bos/supdocs/207915.pdf

2.2 Hobart bushfire risk



Figure 2: Hobart bushfire overlay[18].

Bushfire is Hobart's most significant natural hazard. Its high exposure to bushfire risk is shaped by a combination of biophysical, climatic, and urban development factors:

- The city is surrounded by fire-adapted eucalypt forests and other native vegetation types that support high fuel loads.
- The steep, dissected landscape of kunanyi/Mt Wellington and the surrounding ridgelines accelerates fire spread and complicates access for firefighting.

[18] LISTmap - Land Information System Tasmania

- Climatic systems, which can bring adverse fire weather to Southeast Tasmania, such as strong north-westerly winds, creates conditions that can support high intensity fires.
- Residential expansion into the bushland fringe, particularly in areas like Tolmans Hill, Ridgeway, Fern Tree, and Mt Nelson have increased exposure. Research shows that about 85% of homes lost in bushfires are located within 100 metres of nearby bushland[19].
- The risk of ember attack extends beyond the immediate fire front, with embers potentially reaching the City under severe fire weather conditions. Fuel management reduces but does not eliminate this risk[20].

Key areas of high bushfire risk identified in the Hobart Bushfire Risk Management Plan in the Hobart local government area include[21]:

- the Wellington Range, particularly the eastern slopes of kunanyi/Mt Wellington - including Fern Tree, Strickland Avenue & Old Farm Road
- Mt Nelson/Tolmans Hill areas
- Ridgeway and Summerleas Road areas.

Consistent with the City's Bushfire Management Strategy (2022), the City undertakes a suite of activities across its areas of responsibility to reduce bushfire risk, including land management, building community resilience, statutory planning, regulatory responsibilities, and emergency management. In land management, this includes a rolling program of prescribed burning, mechanical vegetation thinning, fuel break maintenance, and fire-trail and roadside vegetation management. However, with

[19] https://www.naturalhazards.com.au/crc-collection/downloads/bushfire-penetration-urban-areas.pdf
[20] Bushfire Management Strategy - City of Hobart, Tasmania Australia
[21] bushfire-management-strategy-2022.pdf

climate change prescribed burn windows are becoming shorter and treatments may have limited effect on fire spread and intensity under extreme or catastrophic conditions.

Hobart's Eucalypt forests are fire adapted, suggesting that bushfires have been a regular occurrence in and around Hobart. A defining bushfire for Hobart was on 7 February 1967, when multiple fires burned approximately 264,000 ha across southern Tasmania in a matter of hours, claiming 62 lives and destroying over 1,200 homes, with extensive infrastructure damage. While resourcing and capability have grown significantly since 1967, including the professionalisation of firefighting, aerial support and modern detection, the event illustrates that a catastrophic bushfire could still happen here.

Figure 3. Fire progression map of the 1967 Hobart bushfire.

3. METHODOLOGY

The workshop used structured small-group discussions around the three themes of preparedness, evacuation, and response. 33 participants from across councils, Tasmania Fire Service (TFS), State Emergency Service (SES), Tasmania Police (TasPol), Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPAC), TasWater, Bureau of Meteorology, Red Cross, Resilient Building Council, University of Tasmania (UTAS) and RACT contributed to the workshop. Speakers at the beginning of the workshop included presentations from Margaret Moreton, CEO of Gender and Disaster Australia and previous executive director of the Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience; Danny Jackson, Senior Sergeant, TasPol; and, Melanie Gent, Fire and Biodiversity Program Officer with the City of Hobart.

An observation–insight–lessons identified–lessons learned (OILL) approach was used to thematically analyse the workshop discussions and clarify observations through follow-up conversations with member agencies. Please see the workshop agenda at **Appendix A** and workshop questions at **Table 2**.

Table 2

Workshop questions

Preparation: *What are our Strengths in preparation for a catastrophic fire event in Hobart?* *What are the Gaps in our preparedness?* *What are our Priority Actions to improve our preparation? What is your top priority action for improving Preparedness?* **Evacuation:** *What are our Strengths in evacuation for a catastrophic fire event in Hobart?* *What are the Gaps in our evacuation approach?* *What are our Priority Actions to improve our evacuation approach? What is your top priority action for improving our approach to Evacuation?* **Response:** *What are our Strengths in our response to a catastrophic fire event in Hobart?* *What are the Gaps in our response?* *What are our Priority Actions to improve our response? What is your top priority action for improving Hobart's Response?*

4. RESULTS

This chapter presents the observations from the Special Hobart Municipal Emergency Management Committee (HMEMC) workshop. The following sections discuss these insights, reflecting the collective perspectives of workshop participants and highlighting opportunities to enhance Hobart's bushfire resilience. As the workshop included a diverse mix of community, academic, government and other stakeholders, some observations reflect personal or professional perceptions and should not be interpreted as definitive technical analyses or official positions of participating agencies.

4.1 Preparedness

4.1.1 Collaboration

Collaboration and networks was raised as a key strength of emergency preparedness, with many having good working relationships with agencies, other stakeholders such as the UTAS Fire Centre and between councils across the Greater Hobart area.

4.1.2 Community

Participants described close-knit and engaged communities, particularly in peri-urban area, the small scale of the City of Hobart and proximity of services which together enabling quick responses and support community trust in government.
At the same time, some participants noted a lack of community awareness of risk and mitigating actions, limited awareness of plans and available resources, and community understanding of traffic management issues if required to evacuate.

4.1.3 Governance

The Tasmanian emergency management structure, including interagency communications and general governance arrangements was viewed positively. Participants highlighted challenges, including poor compliance by landowners with Bushfire Hazard Management Plans (BHMP); lack of clarity over responsibilities during evacuation; and a policy-to-practice gap in the operation of Municipal Emergency Management Committees (MEMCs).

4.1.4 Households and incentives

Participants observed that many private properties are not adequately maintained, including vegetation clearance around buildings, and that there is a limited understanding and maintenance of BHMPs. They also raised that renters often have limited capacity to implement risk reduction strategies and property level vegetation management can be difficult to coordinate. Regulatory and capacity barriers to reduce risk on private land, people buying properties unaware of its hazard exposure, and ambiguity around rules for managing fire bunkers were also identified.

4.1.5 Planning and research

Participants emphasised improved predictability of catastrophic bushfire conditions, strong research capacity and data availability, and understanding of long-term climate and mitigation planning. However, they also described poor use of available data, limited understanding of residual risks, and limited visibility of infrastructure interdependencies and cascading risk.

4.1.6 Public information, education and warnings

Participants identified TasAlert, online resources such as bushfire.tas.gov.au, proactive education campaigns, community engagement programs (e.g. Sparking Conversations, Igniting Action (SCIA), Bushfire Ready Neighbourhoods (BRN)) as strengths.

They also noted limited resources to continue these community engagement programs and undertake ongoing community resilience building, limited reach to disengaged community members, inconsistent or complex language, overreliance on emergency responders, and limited public understanding of how to prepare and enact household emergency plans.

4.1.7 Resources and capabilities

Dedicated staff resources in state government and some councils, strong preparedness resourcing, and the proactive role of the City of Hobart's Fire and Biodiversity Team were raised as strengths. Participants also identified inadequate funding for community education; lack of resources for door-to-door evacuations; and vulnerability due to single-point dependencies in staffing.

4.1.8 Training and exercises

Regular exercises, including evacuation and shelter scenarios were noted as a preparedness strength. Participants also highlighted the absence of community level training and exercises.

4.1.9 Vulnerable groups

SES-led person-centred preparedness programs were identified positively. Participants also described lack of engagement with those vulnerable to bushfires,

poor identification of at-risk individuals, and limited data sharing and clarity of responsibilities.

4.2 Evacuation

4.2.1 Animals

Participants raised the need for clearer plans regarding animals during evacuations, both in messaging and evacuation centre accommodation.

4.2.2 Collaboration

Interagency and cross-sector collaboration was consistently raised as a strength, including sharing of resources across councils and agencies, government coordination across layers, and strong industry relationships supporting evacuation centres.

However, gaps remain in assumed knowledge between agencies and the need for improved information sharing, particularly traffic modelling and evacuation coordination.

4.2.3 Community

Hobart's small municipal size was raised as a strength, making route planning more feasible. However, gaps in community preparedness and uncertainty about how public would respond during evacuation events were also flagged as concerns.

4.2.4 Evacuation centres

The evacuation centre network was described as a strength, including Hobart-specific planning for equipment and resources for the operation of Hobart centres. However, capacity limitations and coordination challenges were also raised, including managing multiple centres simultaneously due to the limited number of

trained staff and issues around safety and conflict within centres, particularly for children, people with gender-specific needs, and people affected by family violence.

4.2.5 Evacuation routes

Multiple and diverse evacuation routes were seen as a strength, including identified routes and natural firebreaks. However, a larger number of weaknesses were raised including single-road dependencies, limited route options in some locations, and lack of public familiarity with available routes.

4.2.6 Governance

Strong legislative and policy frameworks, as well as clearly defined roles, were identified as strengths. Gaps included the need for transparency of specific evacuation plans and more detailed scenario planning and vertical information-sharing across levels of government.

4.2.7 Infrastructure and assets

The importance of dual-purpose community buildings, such as community halls and fire stations was raised. Participants suggested that if they were retrofitted to be able to resist extreme fire conditions, these facilities could function as places of last resort in emergencies.

4.2.8 Public Information, education and warnings

TasAlert and communication strategies were frequently cited as strengths, along with public engagement through the Bushfire Ready Neighbourhoods and Sparking Conversations, Igniting Action programs, and proactive messaging.

Gaps raised included insufficient consideration of diverse audiences (e.g. people with disability or culturally and linguistically diverse communities), and a need for

communication to be clear and repeated across formats and communication channels.

4.2.9 Training and exercises

Training and simulation activities were seen as strengths, including the integration of real-life scenarios and multi-stakeholder exercises. However, uncertainty remained about how well these plans would perform under real stress.

4.2.10 Vegetation and landscape management

Proactive prescribed burning, fuel management agility, and fire trail upgrades were listed as strengths. Vegetation management along evacuation routes was highlighted as a significant need.

4.2.11 Vulnerable groups

Participants identified gaps in support for vulnerable populations, including people with disability, the elderly, and people experiencing homelessness. Concerns were also raised about data availability, resources for accessible evacuation, and keeping information up to date.

4.3 Response

4.3.1 Collaboration

Collaboration was consistently raised as a core strength during response including good working relationships, resource-sharing practices across councils, and effective coordination during non-routine operations. The smaller scale of Tasmania was also considered beneficial for fostering collaborative relationships across agencies.

4.3.2 Community

Community readiness remains a contested area. Some participants described parts of the community as ready, others noted poor engagement, capability gaps, and unrealistic expectations. Cultural factors, including a tendency to blame authorities rather than take individual preparedness actions, were also raised.

4.3.3 Governance

Governance structures such as Tasmanian Emergency Management Arrangements (TEMA), the use of Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System (AIIMS), and clarity of accountability were noted as key strengths of effective response. Interagency systems are well understood and government processes provide a clear framework for emergency response coordination.

4.3.4 Infrastructure and assets

Critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, particularly telecommunications outages and evacuation centre exhaustion, were raised as risks to response effectiveness.

4.3.5 Planning and research

Local knowledge was viewed as an asset, while limitations were noted in strategic planning by whole-of-government for large-scale and cascading events, including lack of transparent multi-agency plans, and about the implementation of learnings from past reviews.

4.3.6 Public information, education and warnings

Public communication was seen as a relative strength, with timely advice to the community and improved alert systems noted. However, challenges persist in ensuring public understanding of the severity of catastrophic events, countering

misinformation, and maintaining consistent messaging across different platforms and audience needs.

4.3.7 Resources and capabilities

Resource availability was the most frequently cited gap. Concerns included longer-duration events, budget limitations, personnel capacity, and the ability to manage multiple complex events. Equipment, technology, and training were mentioned as existing strengths, though the sustainability of these strengths was questioned under stress.

4.3.8 Training and exercises

Participants acknowledged strong practice of interagency exercises and IMT shift planning. Training was seen as a major strength at the government level. However, a need for more scenario-based training at community and intra-agency levels was flagged as needed.

5. FOCUS AREAS

The preceding chapters outlined the strengths and gaps identified through the workshop. The observations from the workshop led to 36 focus areas for the City of Hobart or partner agencies to explore further. Table 1 outlines the six focus areas within the City of Hobart's control or influence.

Table 2 lists actions which are relevant and within the scope of other organisations' responsibilities. Following consultation on this report, we acknowledge that many of these focus areas are already underway across agencies, and that some are not supported for further action.

Table 1

Suggested City of Hobart focus areas on Hobart bushfire preparedness from observations raised at the workshop on 30 April 2025

#	Focus areas
1	Consider mechanisms and opportunities to provide financial and logistical support to help vulnerable households – especially renters and individuals with limited capacity due to age, disability, illness, or low income – prepare their properties for bushfires, with a focus on vegetation management.
2	Consider opportunities for greater public education and regulation on the maintenance of residential bushfire hazard management plans.
3	Explore the use of incentives such as reduced council rates and/or insurance premiums to encourage private mitigation.

4	Advocate for increased funding for public education and community resilience building, building on the lessons learned from the Sparking Conversations, Igniting Action project and Bushfire-Ready Neighbours program.
5	Consider safety and community inclusion challenges in evacuation centre planning.
6	Explore opportunities to treat vegetation to enhance the safety of evacuation routes.

Table 2

Suggested focus areas for other organisations on Hobart bushfire preparedness from observations raised at the workshop on 30 April 2025

#	Suggested focus area	Relevant organisations
3	Explore the use of incentives such as reduced council rates and/or insurance premiums to encourage private mitigation	City of Hobart / LGAT / Insurers / DPAC
5	Consider safety and inclusion challenges in evacuation centre planning.	City of Hobart / DPAC
7	Consider if additional education for the public on water usage during bushfires is required.	TFS, TasWater

8	Consider if alignment and coordination of MEMCs across Tasmania is sufficient to achieve practical outcomes.	Southern Municipal Coordinators Liaison Forum / Southern Regional Emergency Management Committee (SREMC)
9	Investigate options for mandatory disclosure of property risk at point of sale.	DPAC / LGAT / Councils
10	Research regulatory, financial and institutional barriers that hinder risk reduction efforts on private property.	TFS / DPAC
11	Continue to review governance and resource coordination arrangements for catastrophic fire days to ensure they remain fit for purpose	TFS
12	Improve hazard mapping and critical infrastructure data, particularly to understand critical lifelines and potential for functional isolation.	DPAC
13	Continue to review preparedness messaging for extreme and catastrophic days, ensuring people understand the importance of evacuating ahead of time in the face of such high risk.	TFS

14	Ensure ongoing community education on evacuation plans and risk mitigation activities.	TFS
15	Continue with targeted and inclusive communication strategies to reach disengaged, diverse and vulnerable populations.	TFS
16	Consider the need to diversify roles and reduce staffing dependencies across the emergency management sector.	All
17	Explore the need for simulation exercises involving community participation.	TFS
18	Explore if there is a need for a register of people vulnerable to bushfires in Tasmania	All
19	Continue to ensure evacuation centre logistics are prepared and well-coordinated, particularly for large-scale evacuations.	DPAC / City of Hobart
20	Simulate traffic management scenarios across Hobart to inform evacuation planning and mitigation works on key evacuation routes.	TasPol / Department of State Growth
21	Continue with the development of evacuation plans and consider the need for greater public education and transparency on them	TFS / TasPol

22	Explore if there is a need for dual-purpose community safe spaces	TFS
23	Continue to review preparedness messaging around where to go and what to take during evacuation	TasPol / TFS / SES
24	Continue public guidance initiatives (e.g. QR codes, pet preparedness)	All
25	Consider testing evacuation plans at a larger scale	TasPol
26	Consider the need to conduct more regular, interagency, and realistic simulation exercises, pushing them to test extreme, large-scale, multi-hazard and complex scenarios	SREMC / TFS / SES
27	Empower communities to develop and rehearse their own response plans.	TFS
28	Continue to review interoperability through MoUs and strategic planning.	All
29	Explore the need to strengthen redundancy and backup systems across critical infrastructure.	Utilities
30	Consider the need for multi-agency planning for large-scale and multi-hazard events.	SREMC

31	Continue to review outcomes from past events to ensure that learnings are institutionalised.	All
32	Share community-relevant storytelling (e.g. how events unfold, ignition pathways).	TFS
33	Continue to educate and shift public expectations around the role and limitations of emergency services during a catastrophic bushfire.	All
34	Continue to ensure resource planning meets the needs of extended events and includes contingencies.	TFS / SES / TasPol
35	Leverage and grow Tasmania's volunteer network, and plan how to better leverage spontaneous volunteers during relief and recovery.	DPAC
36	State government agencies to continue to deliver AIIMS and other related trainings, accessible by other agencies and councils.	TFS

6. CONCLUSION

The January 2025 LA Fires underscored the scale, speed, and complexity of catastrophic fire events in urban interface environments, prompting a timely reflection on Hobart's own bushfire risk profile.

Through the expert input of HMEMC members and guests, the analysis highlights both the strengths on which Hobart can build and the gaps that require coordinated action. Strengths include interagency collaboration, established governance structures, and proactive community engagement. Key gaps include limitations in evacuation route safety, maintenance of bushfire hazard management plans, and challenges in supporting vulnerable groups.

The HMEMC endorsed the full report from the workshop at its meeting in October 2025 and will aim to discuss and respond to the focus areas at future meetings.

7. APPENDIX

Appendix A – Agenda

City of HOBART

Agenda items

Item no.	Item	Speaker	Time
1.	**Arrival and lunch**	-	12:30pm – 1:00pm
2.	**Welcome and overview of meeting objectives**	Chair (Cr Anna Reynolds)	1:00pm – 1:10pm
3.	**Presentations – Lessons from the Los Angeles fires and relevant to Hobart** (10 minutes per presentation) a. Dr Margaret Moreton b. Jason Elmer APM c. Melanie Gent	Guest speakers	1:10pm – 2:00pm
4.	**Break**	-	2:00pm – 2:10pm
5.	**Group dialogue – preparedness**	Facilitator	2:10pm – 2:40pm
6.	**Group dialogue – evacuation**	Facilitator	2:40pm – 3:10pm
7.	**Group dialogue – response**	Facilitator	3:10pm – 3:40pm
8.	**Group dialogue – any other items not covered**	Facilitator	3:40pm – 3:50pm
9.	**Summary of outcomes and next steps**	Facilitator/Chair	3:50pm – 4:00pm
10.	**Date of next meeting** Tuesday 14 October 2:00pm – 3:30pm	Chair	
11.	**Meeting close**	Chair	4:00pm

Hobart Town Hall,
50 Macquarie Street,
Hobart, TAS 7000
T 03 6238 2711
E coh@hobartcity.com.au
W hobartcity.com.au